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Abstract
Economic crisis and the resulting need for austerity budgets have divided many governing
parties and coalitions in Europe, despite strong party discipline in the legislative voting on
these harsh budgets. We measure these divisions using automated text analysis methods to
scale the positions that legislators express in budget debates, in an effort to avoid punishment
by voters for supporting austerity measures, while still adhering to strict party discipline by
voting along party lines. Our test case is Ireland, a country that has experienced both periods
of rapid economic growth as well as one deep financial and economic crisis. Tracking dissent
from 1987 to 2013, we show that austerity measures undermine government cohesion, as verbal
opposition markedly increases in direct response to the economic pain felt in a legislator’s
constituency. The economic vulnerability of a legislator’s constituency also directly explains
position taking on austerity budgets among both government and opposition.
Keywords: Text analysis, intra-party politics, economic crisis, budget debates, parliamentary
speeches
Short title for the running header: Government Dissent During Economic Crisis
Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition. Data and supporting
materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the paper are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://
dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). This research was supported by the European Research Council grant
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The most unkindest cut[s] of all; . . . O,
what a fall was there, my countrymen!
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar
Government stability in parliamentary systems depends crucially on one overriding characteristic
of legislative behavior: unity. Without party discipline in voting, especially on critical legislation,
governments quickly come apart, formally or informally, leading to a new government or new elec-
tions. While scholars continue to debate the extent to which parties can be treated as unitary actors
(e.g. Giannetti and Benoit, 2009; Laver and Schofield, 1998), there is little doubt that in order to
stay in government, parties have to enforce sufficient discipline so that they act as unitary actors in
important legislative votes (Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999). Despite the party discipline enforced
in almost every parliamentary democracy, however, we also know that significant heterogeneity
exists within parties. Moreover, legislators often answer to more than one type of principal, and
this may cause tensions when constituency representation clashes with party demands (e.g. Strøm
and Mu¨ller, 2009; McElroy and Benoit, 2010). The more acute the tension between the personal
interests of the legislator and the group interests of his or her party, the more we would expect
the legislator’s preferences to diverge from his or her party’s. This trade-off has been observed in
roll-call data, both in national parliaments (Kam, 2009) and for members of the European Parlia-
ment (Hix, 2002; Lindsta¨dt, Slapin and Vander Wielen, 2011), and more recently for parliamentary
debates (Proksch and Slapin, 2012, 2015) and questions tabled by legislators (Martin, 2011).
Because of the strong party unity enforced in many parliamentary systems, legislative voting
records tell us little about intra-party politics where party discipline is strong. While disunity on roll
calls in parliamentary systems exists, overall levels of unified voting are very high (Sieberer, 2006;
Carey, 2007; Depauw and Martin, 2009), especially on key legislative decisions, such as the annual
government budget.1 What legislators say, however, is typically less constrained. Legislative
speeches are seldom, if ever, subject to formal sanction for those who speak out of turn. Indeed,
party leaders may view floor debates as an opportunity for reluctantly faithful members to send
1Sieberer (2006), using roll-call data from 11 parliamentary systems, finds that party unity is lowest in Sweden,
Germany, New Zealand and, particularly, Finland. Compared to the the US Congress, however, unity is still very high,
with an average score of 97 on the Rice index of party cohesion that ranges from 0 to 100. Depauw and Martin (2009)
find that party unity in voting is particularly high in Ireland.
3
messages to their constituents, as long as they follow party instructions when it comes to voting
(Proksch and Slapin, 2012, 2015). For these reasons, the text analysis of parliamentary speeches
has formed an important leg of the empirical study of intra-party preferences (e.g. Proksch and
Slapin, 2010; Laver and Benoit, 2002; Lauderdale and Herzog, 2015; Schwarz, Traber and Benoit,
Forthcoming). The words that legislators use can be scaled into positions providing a potentially
much more valid indicator of their preferences than the votes they cast.
In this paper, we exploit this feature of parliamentary texts to measure the strain placed on
party unity by austerity budgets: those dividing not only government and opposition, but also gov-
erning parties and coalitions by requiring deep and deeply painful clawbacks of services, tax raises,
and spending cuts.2 Austerity budgets are an unfortunately familiar feature of European politics,
since the onset of the Eurozone crisis in banking and sovereign debt servicing. The challenge of
passing these severe budgets, often necessitated by externally imposed conditions of emergency
funding packages, has split and sometimes brought down governments. Legislators will engage
in blame avoidance to avoid voters punishing them for the pain their austerity measures have in-
flicted, whether this punishment is real as in Pierson (1996)’s “new politics” of the welfare state
or only perceived (Wenzelburger, 2014). In systems of strong party discipline, however, legis-
lators also fear the wrath of opposing their party, whose punishments can include expulsion for
voting against important measures such as budgets. The only viable blame avoidance strategy then
becomes verbal opposition, voting for a painful budget while speaking against it.
Austerity budgets provide a good context for testing the limits of observable behavior as a
measure of preferences, because they are plausibly about a single dimension: taking responsibil-
ity for painful cuts sooner in order to get better later, versus short-term desires to avoid painful
2And often producing in electorates the same sense of disappointment and betrayal as in our title reference, with
disastrous electoral consequences. The continuation of the quotation in Act 3, scene 2 is “Then I, and you, and all of
us fell. . . ”
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measures while refusing to accept responsibility.3 Because austerity measures are neatly packaged
in the form of annual budgets, are proposed by governing parties, and are subject to fairly con-
strained rules of parliamentary debate, we tend to observe text generation on a single topic within
a fairly regulated format (Lowe and Benoit, 2013). The potential to produce scaled estimates of
“ideal points” using text as data, therefore, has great potential in the arena of debates over aus-
terity measures. Furthermore, understanding positioning in and ultimately the outcomes of these
highly significant debates is crucial to understanding the means to implement successfully such
difficult but necessary measures. Successful measurement of intra-party differences in this context
thus serves as both an ideal methodological validation of the ability to scale underlying positions
from texts using statistical methods, as well as helping to understand the dynamics of support and
opposition to one of the most difficult political and economic challenges of the decade.
In what follows, we measure expressed levels of government support in the face of conflicting
pressures from constituent and party demands, in response to unpopular austerity measures. Using
the debates from 27 Irish budgets from 1987 to 2013, we estimate who is selected to speak as well
as the positions of individual legislators in each debate, and systematically relate speaker selection
and expressed dissent to variation in party and constituency-level political variables.
Our analysis shows that government “backbenchers” (members of a governing party without
ministerial offices) are more likely to speak against budgets than are cabinet members, a tendency
that intensifies in response to the pressures of financial crisis. Those with more economically
vulnerable constituencies, all other factors being held constant, are more likely to speak against
budgets. The pain of fiscal austerity undermines government cohesion, as legislators seek to avoid
blame in direct response to the pain felt by their local constituents.
3Parliamentary speech has been analyzed previously with an aim to locating legislators’ policy preferences but
the dimensions of policy measured in these applications has been less than clear. Monroe and Maeda (2004), for
instance, were unable to provide a clear interpretation of the primary dimension to emerge from their two-dimensional
scaling model of US Senate speeches. Proksch and Slapin (2010) had to interpret their single estimated dimension
from the European Parliament by resorting to correlations with roll-call vote analysis and independent expert surveys.
Such problems point to a need for scaling models that take a different approach to dimensionality, namely one where
plausible positioning on an a priori dimension is used to anchor the analysis. Alternatively, a careful selection of texts
to limit speeches to a particular (one-dimensional) policy context where the primary axis of difference is known would
make it much easier to interpret scales ex post.
5
Budgets and the Politics of Economic Crisis
Our case study in austerity budgets is Ireland, one of the first European states to experience a deep
banking crisis and receive a multi-billion euro bailout with austerity conditions attached. Begin-
ning in 2008, the country experienced a steep decline in economic output and a sharp rise in unem-
ployment, accompanied by a massive debt problem caused by the financial load of recapitalizing
a failing banking system. This forced the government to implement a number of severe austerity
measures against a background of growing public resentment, ultimately leading to a record low in
the popularity ratings for the government parties and a breakdown in January 2011 of the coalition
led by Fianna Fa´il, a party that had led Ireland continuously since 1997. Addressing the crisis
required an e85 billion rescue package from the European Union and the International Monetary
Fund, a bailout that led to tax cutbacks in social spending equivalent to e20 billion, or 13 per cent
of GDP (Bergin et al., 2011, 51). The painful cuts included emergency taxes and highly contested
revisions to wage agreements, while leaving the public perception that the bankers who had caused
the crisis were getting rescued.
During the three decades that we examine, Fianna Fa´il (FF) dominated Irish politics. It
governed alone from 1987–1989, with its main junior coalition partner the Progressive Democrats
(PD) from 1989-1993, in a short-lived coalition with the Labour Party (LAB) from 1993-1994,
and again with PD from 1997–2009. From 2007-2009, the FF-PD coalition additionally included
the Green party, which became FF’s main coalition partner from 2009–2011 after the dissolution
of PD in 2009.4 FF alternated office with Fine Gael (FG) twice during the time period in our
data. From 1994–1997 when FG, LAB and Democratic Left (DL) (a small socialist party that
merged with LAB in 1999) formed a three-party coalition after LAB resigned from the FF-led
coalition over internal disputes in 1994. Then again after the 2011 general election, when FG and
Lab formed a coalition following the collapse of the FF-Green coalition as a result of the financial
crisis. Compared to main parties in other European countries, FF and FG are relatively similar
4The Progressive Democrats essentially ceased to exist as a parliamentary party in 2009. The sole remaining PD
cabinet member, Mary Harney, remained in office and continued to support the government as an independent.
6
in terms of their policy positions (Weeks, 2009a; Benoit and Laver, 2005), with their primary
differences based mainly on historical reasons and tradition. Table A.1 in Appendix A details the
full composition of the governments included in our analysis.
Party competition in Ireland has been shown to take place mainly between the government
and the opposition blocs (Hansen, 2009). This divide is also clearly reflected in legislative debates
over the budget, following the annual presentation of a budget by the Minister for Finance. In
these debates legislators are free to discuss the budget, with governing party members and minis-
ters typically expressing support, and opposition parties invariably criticizing the budget and the
government that produced it. Given the strong party discipline in Ireland (Gallagher, 2009), budget
votes follow strict party lines. Voting against the government’s financial bill or resigning from the
party are extreme measures that only a few MPs—known in Ireland as Teachtaı´ Da´la (TDs)—are
willing to face. Party discipline in Ireland, indeed, makes the two equivalent, since voting against
the party on a budget would result in expulsion from the party. In parliamentary systems like Ire-
land, where budgets are written entirely by the party in government, votes on these national fiscal
plans are very much votes for or against the government itself, and indeed were the government to
lose such a vote, it would fall and a new coalition would have to be formed (Gallagher, Laver and
Mair, 2011).
In addition to very strong party discipline, Ireland also has an electoral system that gives TDs
strong incentives to promote their constituency interests and to cultivate a personal vote (Gallagher
and Komito, 2009; Marsh, 2007), which has been observed in interviews with legislators (Wood
and Young, 1997; Heitshusen, Young and Wood, 2005), surveys (Martin, 2010), and parliamentary
questions (Martin, 2011). Proksch and Slapin (2015) have shown that in this situation party leaders
tend to allow legislators to speak more freely than in systems with weaker personal vote incentives,
such as the closed list PR systems common in continental Europe (see Proksch and Slapin, 2015,
82–83 for an excellent overview). The strong ties between legislators and their constituents in
the single-transferable vote electoral system leaves TDs vulnerable to public resentment resulting
from unpopular policies. In their time allocated for speaking in the budget debates, legislators have
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both a motive and an opportunity to voice relative levels of support or disagreements, nuances,
or other pertinent concerns, and have these views go on public record. Legislators signal these
differences not only to constituents but also to fellow party members. Speeches offer the chance
to cast a reluctant verbal vote, to display one’s ministerial credentials, or to indicate the level
of vociferousness of an opposition member’s attitude against the government. For a variety of
reasons, therefore, what legislators say has the potential to reveal important intra-party differences
in budget debates whose votes follow strictly party lines.
During the economic crisis that emerged following the crash of Ireland’s property boom,
voters blamed the government that had presided throughout the “Celtic Tiger” period of approxi-
mately 1995–2005. Accepting the austerity budgets was closely linked to legitimizing the role and
responsibility of the government in causing the crisis. Relative support for austerity measures in
the budgets during the period we examine, therefore, combines support for government’s ability to
guide the Irish economy out of the crisis with the desire to move on to solving the problems rather
than identifying blame. Relative opposition to the budgets, on the other hand, signals a rejection of
the government’s competence to resolve the crisis, as well as a rejection of the perceived injustice
of having society bear the costs of hard-biting austerity plans necessitated by the government’s
irresponsible financial management during the economic boom. Our argument, in a nutshell, is
that legislators, and particularly backbenchers, may engage in “blame avoidance” (Pierson, 1996;
Starke, 2006) by distancing themselves from the proposed austerity measures, motivated by con-
stituents that are more sensitive to losses than to gains (Weaver, 1986, 373). Because it involves
imposing tangible losses on constituents in exchange for diffuse and uncertain gains, the politics
of austerity are “treacherous” (Pierson, 1996, 145) and divisive. Speeches over austerity budgets
offer opposition a “blood in the water” opportunity to apportion blame to the ruling coalition, and
present chances for governing parties forced to support the budgets a chance to position themselves
verbally to avoid blame.
Our argument is best illustrated by the events that surrounded the announcement of the first
emergency budget in 2008. Ireland officially entered recession in mid-2008, leading to the an-
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nouncement of an early budget in October 2008 for the fiscal year 2009. The budget proposal,
which was introduced by Finance Minister Brian Lenihan (Fianna Fa´il), called for cuts in health
spending, a reintroduction of university fees, a one percent emergency levy on income, and an
abolition of the automatic entitlement to free health care services for those aged over 70 years. The
last change in particular—the abolition of automatic “medical card” entitlement—led to public
outrage whose scope and scale few in the government had anticipated, generating extreme tension
between the coalition parties and between Fianna Fa´il backbenchers and their party leadership.
The Green party publicly criticized the government for the way it handled the medical card
controversy, accusing it for causing “unnecessary distress and confusion amongst our older people
and their families”.5 Fianna Fa´il backbenchers revolted against the proposed austerity measures
and a small group of backbenchers even threatened to vote against the government in an upcoming
motion put forward by the opposition parties. One TD resigned from the party and joined the
opposite side as an independent, calling into doubt the stability of the government and the authority
of Brian Cowen, Taoiseach (Irish prime minister) and FF party leader.6 In the end, the government
backed down and softened the changes.7
The medical card reversal presents but one example of legislators trying to avoid public
resentment resulting from unpopular budget cuts. It illustrates the dilemma that government TDs
face: one the one hand, they must stick to the party line and defend the austerity measures. On
the other hand, they are pressured by their constituents to act against the government’s policies.
Especially in systems combining strong party discipline with a strong personal vote, the politics
of austerity create strong counter-pressures on individual members of ruling parties both to follow
the party line and to engage in blame avoidance to avoid punishment by local constituents.
Charlie O’Connor of FF—a true politician’s politician—for example remarked the following
5Green party spokeswoman Deirdre de Bu´rca, quoted in “Greens criticise way medical card issue was handled,”
Irish Times, October 21, 2008, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/1021/1224454426027.
html, last accessed on April 14, 2015.
6“Chaos in FF calls Cowen’s authority into question,” Irish Times, October 20, 2008, http://www.irishtimes.
com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1020/1224279464929.html, last accessed on April 14, 2015.
7“Government backs down on key budget measures,” Irish Times October 21, 2008, http://www.irishtimes.
com/news/government-backs-down-on-key-budget-measures-1.830436, last accessed on April 14, 2015.
9
in his speech on the austerity budget:
I will not forget where I am from and will not forget the issues that are of concern to my
community. . . . I spend all day, every day in my constituency. However. . . those who
voted for me were clear that I was a Fianna Fa´il Deputy who was under the Fianna Fa´il
banner and that is my position. While I am not commenting on any other colleague,
I strongly believe that one sticks to one’s tasks and focuses on the issues. One should
have the courage to bring matters to the attention of ones party leadership, both before
the parliamentary party and in other conversations, and one tries to correct things that
were done wrongly.
In a similar vein, Deputy Paul Gogarty from the Green Party, the junior coalition partner of
FF, summed up his opposition to the budget thus:
The Government has my vote but no Government will take away my conscience. In
all conscience I cannot give the budget a ringing endorsement. It is like the proverbial
curate’s egg: good in parts but with bits that would turn one’s stomach . . . .
Because one of a legislator’s principals is a local constituency, and local constituencies vary,
the acuteness of each TD’s dilemma will also vary with the characteristics of his or her local
supporters. A legislator’s other principal, of course, is the party. Consequently, we expect that a
legislator’s counter-pressure to toe the party line—even verbally—will also vary with his or her
position within the party or within government. Cabinet members are much more constrained than
backbenchers to oppose the budget, as the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility prevents
ministers from publicly opposing government decisions.
For some deputies, local electoral pressures overwhelm loyalty to party, even at the cost of
expulsion from the party. On budgetary matters, discipline is strictly enforced, such that opposition
to the government’s fiscal measures are punished by expulsion. In 2011, prior to the first budget
following the election of a new government earlier that year, this happened to three government
TDs, for instance. Patrick Nulty, TD from Dublin West, was expelled from Labour for taking a
public stance against announced budget cuts. Tommy Broughan was also expelled after he opposed
the Government’s renewal of the bank guarantee scheme. They joined former Junior Minister
Willie Penrose, who left over the closure of Columb Barracks in Mullingar, and Fine Gael’s Denis
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Naughten who was expelled from Fine Gael for refusing to support cutbacks at the Roscommon
hospital in his constituency.8
Data: Irish Budget Speeches, 1987–2013
Our analysis includes 27 Irish budget debates for the time period from 1987 to 2013.9 We retrieved
all speeches from DPSI: Database of Parliamentary Speeches in Ireland (Herzog and Mikhaylov,
2013), a complete collection of all speeches from the Irish parliament that also includes speaker-
specific information, such as party affiliations, constituencies, and office positions.
Every debate begins with the official budget statement by the Minister of Finance, followed
by the official spokesperson of the opposition, who is usually the leader of the largest opposition
party. Then, and usually on a separate day, the Taoiseach comments on the budget, followed by
speeches from the party leaders. The remaining time is filled by other government and opposition
speakers selected by their respective party whips. The speeches by the Minister of Finance and the
official opposition speaker are limited to 45 minutes. All other speakers receive 20–40 minutes,
though some speakers shared their time with other TDs. The median speech length we observed
was 1,657 words, with ministers typically making the longest speeches. Contributions to budget
debates are typically political rather than technical in nature, with speakers expressing their support
of or opposition to announced budget measures. Technical details of the budget are discussed in
subsequent committee debates that are excluded from our analysis.
In a typical budget debate, only about a third of TDs (median 53) in the 166-member Irish
parliament speak, but this varies from as few as 14 speakers during the debate of the austerity
budget for 2010 to as many as 95 speakers for the 2009 budget (see Table A.2 in Appendix A). We
collected data for all TDs from 1987 to 2013 whether they spoke or not, in order to examine the
8“Six weeks in Dail Eireann and Patrick Nulty is a rebel,” Irish Indepen-
dent, December 7, 2011, http://www.independent.ie/national-news/budget/news/
six-weeks-in-dail-eireann-and-patrick-nulty-is-a-rebel-2956226.html, last accessed on April
14, 2015.
9Starting in 1997, budget debates take place in December for the budget of the following fiscal year. Throughout
this paper, we refer to debates by their fiscal year.
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process determining who speaks in addition to examining the positions expressed.
Our key variables of interest are two measures of the trade-off between constituency interests
and party pressure: the economic vulnerability of local constituencies to austerity and electoral
safety. We measure economic vulnerability as the proportion of constituents on the “Live Reg-
ister,” the officially recorded number of people who have registered for unemployment benefits
or related social welfare benefits, which can be considered a measure of short-term trends in un-
employment.10 Because social welfare benefits formed one of the main targets for cuts in the
crisis budgets, this variable provides a good proxy for a constituency’s vulnerability to austerity
measures.
To measure electoral safety, we calculate each TD’s first preference votes as a proportion of
the overall district quota required to win a seat. Ireland uses the single-transferable vote electoral
system in which voters rank candidates in multi-member districts. To be elected, candidates have
to reach the district quota, which is calculated as the minimum number of votes required to fill
the available district seats. A candidate’s first preference votes is equal to the number of voters
who have ranked the candidate first. When divided by the overall district quota, a value greater
than one means that a candidate was elected with a surplus of first preference votes, while a value
below one means that a candidate was only elected after votes from those who received a seat were
transferred. Because larger values indicate a larger margin between a candidate’s first preference
votes and the votes of all other candidates, this variable provides a good measure of electoral
safety.11
10We collected this data from the Department of Social Protection’s annual publication “Statistical Information on
Social Welfare Services,” which reports average numbers on the Live Register by county. There are 26 counties in
Ireland and 43 legislative constituencies, which means some counties include more than one constituency. This is
particularly the case for the four largest cities—Cork, Dublin, Galway, and Limerick—with Dublin being the largest
county with more than 10 constituencies. Because data is not available at the level of constituencies, we use the same
unemployment rate for all legislators from the same county. We believe this is a reasonable approach because low
unemployment rates in densely populated cities affect people and their representatives beyond district boundaries.
The Department of Social Protection reports absolute numbers on the Live Register. To calculate proportions, we used
county population estimates from censuses conducted in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2002, 2006, and 2011.
11General elections were held in 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2011.We collected the election data from
“Nealon’s Guide,” which is a comprehensive election guide that is published after every general election.
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Explaining Speaker Selection
Not all deputies participate in the budget debate, and not every budget debate includes the same
number of speakers. Who can speak and for how long depends on a number of factors. The gov-
ernment controls the parliamentary agenda as well as the number of days allocated for the debate,
which limits the overall number of speakers. Further, only members of a parliamentary group rec-
ognized by the Standing Orders (i.e., rules of procedure) have full speaking rights. Members of
smaller parties and independents receive less time to speak, unless they form a so called techni-
cal group.12 Within those constraints, it is party whips who decide which speakers are allocated
speaking time, with the final decision who speaks lying with the chairman (Ceann Comhairle),
who is considered to be impartial.
Because the selection to speak is potentially endogenous to the politics of austerity and re-
lated support or opposition to the budgets that we are attempting to explain through speech content,
in this section we examine the determinants of speaker selection. We find strong evidence that gov-
ernment backbenchers and those representing economically vulnerable constituencies were less
likely to be included in debates on austerity measures than other members.
We first look at the composition of budget debates by calculating the participation rates of
cabinet members, government backbenchers and opposition members. Because these groups differ
in size, we calculate the log odds ratio for each group as the proportion of those who spoke to the
group’s overall proportion in parliament (Figure 1). A value greater/less than zero means that
a group is over-/underrepresented compared to what would be expected under even chances of
selection to speak. By examining changes in the log odds ratio over time and across different
categories of speakers, according to whether they were in the cabinet, in a governing party but not
12 Parties with at least seven members are recognized as a parliamentary group. Deputies who are not members of a
parliamentary group (i.e., independents and members of small parties) can form a technical group, which requires that
at least seven deputies request to be formally recognized as a group (Article 120, Da´il E´ireann Standing Orders, 2011).
The requirements for being recognized as a group have changed over time, which makes it difficult to determine the
exact speaking right of each deputy under the Standing Orders at that time. Further, it is not uncommon for speakers
to share their speaking time with other members, which means the likelihood to speak is determined by more than
procedural rules. We therefore make the simplifying assumption that each legislator can be selected to speak, though
we control below for factors that may explain debate participation.
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Figure 1: Log odds ratios of cabinet members, government backbenchers, and opposition members
who participated in budget debates, 1987–2013.
in the cabinet (backbenchers), or in opposition, we see patterns emerge in the changing dynamics
of speaker selection.
Figure 1 shows that until about 2008, the last budget year before the crisis, each group par-
ticipated at roughly similar odds. An exception is the 2006 budget debate, which was the third
smallest debate (in terms of number of speakers) in our sample and which only included a sin-
gle government backbencher. With the onset of the crisis in 2009, we see a significant decline in
backbench participation and an increase in the participation rates of cabinet members.
To test speaker selection more systematically, we estimate a multivariate probit model that in-
cludes the following variables: our measure of economic district vulnerability, which for simplicity
we denote as “constituency unemployment”; electoral safety; a dummy variable for belonging to a
government party (backbench and cabinet); a dummy variable indicating a speaker was a member
of the cabinet; a dummy variable for party leaders; legislative seniority, measured by the number of
years in parliament at the time of speaking; and a dummy variable for the crisis years (the budget
years of 2009–2013). We include two additional control variables to capture TDs’ variable expo-
sures for participating in a debate: party size (since members from large parties are less likely to
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be selected) and the number of days that were scheduled for the debate (as longer debates increase
everyone’s likelihood to speak).13
Strictly speaking, each deputy has a different likelihood to speak that depends on the number
of speakers that were selected before him or her. Because accounting for these individual likeli-
hoods would unnecessarily complicate the model, we instead take the log of each exposure variable
to account for the marginal decrease in their effects.
Each row in our data set is one legislator-year observation. In each year, there are 166 leg-
islators (the size of parliament) from which speakers can be selected. We exclude from this set
the Speaker and Deputy Speaker (Cheann Comhairle and Leas Cheann Comhairle, respectively)
as well as the finance minister and opposition spokesperson, because these speakers participate in
every debate.
We index legislator-year observations i ∈ 1,2, . . .N and individual legislators j ∈ 1,2, . . .M.
Our dependent variable yi is 1 for TDs who were selected to speak, and 0 otherwise. This model
could be estimated as a simple non-hierarchical logit or probit model, but this would ignore the
repeated nature of the data with legislator-year observations clustered within individual legislators,
and with covariates measured at both the year level (e.g., constituency unemployment, legislative
seniority) and the legislator level (e.g., party leadership or party size, which vary less over years).
On average, each TD appears about 10 times in our data set, with some TDs only appearing once
(such as those who retired during a legislative term or were appointed to outside offices) and some
appearing in each of the 27 years included in our sample.
To account for the nested structure of our data, we specify a hierarchical probit model with
varying intercepts, α j, for TDs that are assumed to be normally distributed with mean µα and
13Ireland has a relative large number of independent deputies who regularly occupy between 5 and 10 percent of
seats (Weeks, 2009a,b). We treat them as a single group when calculating their exposures for participating in a debate.
A related question is how to treat independents that supported a government. Two governments in our sample relied
on the support of independents: the 1987–1989 FF single-party minority government, which was three seats short
of a majority, and the 1997-2002 FF-PD coalition, which was supported by four independents, three which were
necessary to reach a majority. We code these independents as opposition members because their cross-pressure from
constituency interests and party demands is different than for regular government members, though we note that this
coding decision has no impact on the reported results because of the small number of observations affected by it (6
out of all 444 individual legislators (1.4%), or 26 out of all 4,333 repeated observations (0.6%)).
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variance σ2TD. An advantage of this specification over the non-hierarchical (i.e., completely pooled)
model is the partial pooling of the estimated intercepts. For legislators who only appear a few times
in our data, the intercept will shrink towards the group mean µα, while for those that appear more
often and provide more information, the intercepts will be closer to a fixed-effects model that
estimates a separate mean for each TD (Gelman and Hill, 2006). The full model we estimate has
the following form:
yi ∼ Bernoulli(pii) (1)
pii =Φ(α j[i]+X ′iβ) (2)
α j ∼ N(µα,σ2TD) (3)
We fit this model using Bayesian inference and with non-informative priors for all parameters. We
use Bayesian inference because of its greater flexibility in model specification and more meaning-
ful measures of uncertainty compared to maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, though we note
that ML yields substantively identical results.14 For easier model convergence, we standardize the
continuous measures to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in this and all follow-
ing models, but we report results on the original scales of the variables when computing quantities
of interest.
Figure 2 (and Table B.3 in Appendix B) presents the results from three models. In all three
models, we find that party leaders and cabinet members—compared to the average opposition
member—have the highest probability of speaking, while government members are less likely to
be selected. All other things being equal, we also find that the level of constituency employment is
positively related to the probability of speaking.
To focus on the effects of austerity, we include a dummy variable called “Crisis” that indi-
cates whether the budget was debated in 2008 or after (for fiscal years 2009 and after). When
constituency unemployment is interacted with the crisis indicator, we see the positive effect of the
14Results for all models estimated via maximum likelihood are included in the online appendix.
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Figure 2: Coefficient plots for multilevel probit models of speaker selection. Continuous measures
are z-transformed.
unemployment rate reversing: more unemployment reduces a legislator’s probability of partici-
pating in a debate, a pattern also seen clearly in the top panel of Figure 3 which shows predicted
probabilities for changes in unemployment rates before and during the crisis. That graphic also
shows how during the crisis years, government members were much less likely to speak in general
than opposition members, a difference that does not occur pre-crisis. Because we estimate a sepa-
rate effect for cabinet members (who are also indicated by the government dummy variable), this
means government members who are not in the cabinet (i.e., government backbenchers) have the
lowest probability of speaking.
Turning to our measure of electoral safety (bottom panel of Figure 3), we find that the 95%
credible intervals on the estimated probabilities are too wide to draw conclusions from the results.
One problem might be that our measure of electoral safety, which is calculated from election
results, is constant between election years and hence varies little over the time period we observe.
Furthermore, past election results might be a poor proxy for future expected electoral safety during
times of economic crisis.
Finally, as expected, the number of days allocated to the debate significantly increases the
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probability of any legislator speaking, while party size has no notable effect. Party leaders are more
likely to speak than party members. Legislative seniority decreases debate participation, probably
because some of the potentially positive effect of seniority is captured by the effects for cabinet
members and party leaders, who tend to be senior legislators.
Explaining Expressed Dissent
Method: Supervised Text Scaling Using Wordscores
To measure the degree of expressed support for each budget, we use the Wordscores method of
Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003), a scaling model for texts on a single dimension after training it
with a series of anchoring documents whose positions are assumed to be known. Our implemen-
tation sets a reference score of 1.0 for each finance minister’s speech, and -1.0 for each opposition
finance spokesperson’s speech. Within budget year, we computed a document-term matrix of word
counts, normalized by word frequency, for every speech in the debate, Fi j =Ci j ·Ci+ (where Ci+
denotes the row marginal (sum) of row i).15 Taking o, f as the document indexes of the opposition
and finance minister speeches respectively, we slice out Yi j where i ∈ (o, f ), so that Y
2×J
represents
the normalized term counts for the opposition and finance minister speeches. We then computed
the “word score” s
1×J
in the following series of steps:
P
J×2
= Y′/Y+ j (4)
s
J×1
= P′
−1
1
 (5)
15The results we show operate on the entirety of the texts, without stemming, trimming, manicuring, polishing,
or otherwise manipulating or selecting features. The only exception is that we “smoothed” the word counts for the
reference texts by adding one to the count of each term observed in the debate. This does not affect any of the results
in a material way.
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The “text scores” can then be computed as:
S
I×1
= F
I×J
s
J×1
(6)
To make the documents scores S comparable across years, we applied the rescaling proposed
by Martin and Vanberg (2007), a procedure that ensures that the scaled positions of the reference
texts are reset to the scores used to train the system: -1.0 for the opposition finance spokesperson
and 1.0 for the finance minister, with all other speeches’ scores set relative to those values. Taking
So and S f as the text scores of opposition and finance minister speeches respectively, this linear
rescaling (for the two-class example with -1.0, 1.0 as reference scores) is:
S∗i =
2 (Si−So)
S f −So −1 (7)
While not always recommended, this transformation ensures that all other documents’ scaled val-
ues are positioned relative to the reference documents (Benoit and Laver, 2007), an outcome we
explicitly desire in our budget-by-budget comparison. Each position is then “fixed” relative to the
positions of the government and opposition finance spokespersons, making the scores comparable
across budgets according to a common benchmark.16 We next turn to a description of government
and opposition unity estimated from these positions. Results for each individual speaker and each
debate are included in the online appendix.
16Wordscores falls into the class of supervised scaling methods. An unsupervised alternative for scaling positions
from textual data is the latent variable model dubbed “Wordfish” by Slapin and Proksch (2008), which models word
generation in a document as a Poisson process from which a latent variable representing the document position can
be estimated. In the context of a subset of the Irish budget debates examined here, Lowe and Benoit (2013) success-
fully validated the Wordfish approach against human coders. We use supervised scaling, however because it allows us
estimating speeches on a ex ante defined dimension anchored by the speeches of the finance minister and opposition
spokesperson. By anchoring the positions in each debate according to the finance minister and opposition spokesper-
son, we are able explicitly to measure every other speaker’s position relative to these anchors, and to compare their
positioning across speeches.
20
Government versus opposition unity
Relative to the fixed extremes of supporting and opposing the budget as set out in the speeches of
the government and opposition spokespersons, we can compare the distribution of position-taking
among government and opposition legislators over time.
Figure 4 plots the distribution of estimated positions for government and opposition mem-
bers, showing as expected that the typical government speaker was more supportive of the budget
than the typical opposition speaker. There are two interesting summary results related to party
unity visible in Figure 4. First, governmental positions were always more heterogenous than oppo-
sition positions. When it comes to hardball distributive politics, apportioning blame is apparently
far easier than taking it. Second, there are also clear differences in verbal support for the budget
between cabinet members and government backbenchers. The former are bound by the doctrine
of collective cabinet responsibility and hence we expect that they would be more supportive of the
government budget than the backbenchers from their parties. The plots bear out this expectation,
showing not only that government ministers are more pro-budget, but on average are also more
unified than their non-ministerial colleagues.
Figure 5 plots the mean position of each of these three groups—cabinet members, govern-
ment backbenchers, and opposition speakers—over time, to highlight the group differences in a
trend comparison. Very consistently, we see three groups whose ordering reinforces our expec-
tations. Cabinet members are consistently the most pro-budget group, the opposition is the most
anti-budget group, and government backbenchers’ positions lay in the middle.
In Figure 6, we plot the interquartile range of estimated positions for the government and the
opposition.17 The two trend lines in this plot reinforce our observation that government cohesion
has decreased during the crisis. Since the onset of austerity budgets beginning 2009, government
cohesion visibly decreases, at the same time that the opposition positions became more similar.
To summarize, we find evidence that the financial crisis has driven apart the typical expressed
17The interquartile range is a measure of statistical dispersion that is calculated as the difference between the upper
and lower quartiles. Using alternative measures of dispersion, such as the standard deviation, show the same decrease
of government cohesion over time.
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Figure 4: Boxplots of estimated Wordscores positions of budget support for cabinet members,
government backbenchers, and opposition members. Box width is proportional to group size.
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support for the budget by cabinet ministers, who are constrained by the doctrine of collective cab-
inet responsibility, versus their non-ministerial government colleagues. In the following section,
we take a closer look at the source of this intra-party division and provide evidence that TDs from
counties that are hit particularly hard by the crisis take more anti-government positions.
Explaining Intra-Party Differences
What explains differences in expressed positions among members from the same party? As dis-
cussed above, we conjecture that legislators are cross-pressured by their constituents to act against
the government’s policies and by the need to implement austerity measures and to stick to the of-
ficial party line. The magnitude of this dilemma is different for each deputy. First, we expect that
expressed positions to the government budget are a function of office positions, with cabinet mem-
bers being the most supportive legislators. Second, we expect that legislators from districts that are
more vulnerable to austerity are more pressured to oppose the government’s austerity measures.
Third, we expect that legislators from safe districts are more immune to party pressure and hence
more able to freely express their opposition to austerity measures.
To explain expressed government dissent, we estimate a hierarchical linear regression. We
index speaker-year observations i ∈ 1,2, . . .N and individual legislators j ∈ 1,2, . . .M. Our depen-
dent variable yi is the Wordscores estimate for each speaker-year observation i. We again estimate
varying intercepts α j that are normally distributed with mean µα and variance σ2TD:
yi ∼N (µi,σ2) (8)
µi = α j[i]+X ′iβ (9)
α j ∼N (µα,σ2TD) (10)
The results of this model are summarized in Figure 7 (and detailed in Table B.4 in Ap-
pendix B). As expected, cabinet members are the most pro-budget speakers. Bound by collec-
tive cabinet responsibility, their mandate is to defend the government budget during economic
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good times as well as bad. Government members without a seat in the cabinet express less pro-
government positions, but are still more pro-government than opposition speakers, the control
group.
When the unemployment rate in a speaker’s constituency increases, however, his or her ex-
pressed support for the budget visibly decreases, especially among government backbenchers and
especially during the economic crisis years. This result is indicated clearly in the top panel of
Figure 8 showing fitted values estimated from the model. While there is no effect of constituency
unemployment rate pre-crisis, an increase in unemployment decreases government support during
the crisis. The magnitude of this effect is substantial. Increasing the unemployment rate by 10
percentage points from 3 to 13%, which corresponds to the value range that includes most of the
observations during the crisis, decreases the estimated Wordscores score by about 0.3 points, which
corresponds to about one standard deviation on the estimated scale. For unemployment rates above
20%, the highest observed rate in our sample, the average government backbencher is estimated to
express the same level of opposition than the average opposition member. Finally, turning to the
effect of electoral safety (bottom panel of Figure 8), we again find no systematic effect as indicated
by the relative wide credible intervals on the fitted values.
A Joint Model of Speaker Selection and Expressed Dissent
The fact that not all legislators participate in the budget debate points towards a potential selection
bias. We have already found clear evidence that government backbenchers are less likely to speak
on budget debates during the crisis. If those who speak are not selected randomly, our estimates
of speaker positioning from the previous section might be biased and inconsistent. More precisely,
if there are unmeasured factors that explain both speaker selection and expressed positions, these
unobserved factors would be correlated with the observed measures in the outcome equation re-
gardless of whether or not they are correlated in the full sample.
For example, suppose that TDs’ opposition or support of the budget also depends on their at-
titude towards the EU, with those opposing foreign intervention into their country’s fiscal matters
25
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Figure 7: Coefficient plots for multilevel linear regression models of position taking. Continuous
measures are z-transformed.
also opposing the austerity measures. Suppose “attitude towards the EU” is uncorrelated with gov-
ernment status in the population. That is, if speakers were drawn randomly, our OLS estimate for
government status would be unbiased and consistent. Now suppose those with negative attitudes
towards the EU make a greater effort to be included in the debate. As a result, the unmeasured
factor might be correlated with government status in the outcome equation, even though this is
not the case in the population. To see this, consider that opposition members are on average more
likely than government backbenchers to speak, and some of them will happen to have positive at-
titudes towards the EU. Government backbenchers in this example, however, must have a negative
attitude towards the EU because otherwise they are unlikely to be included in the speaker sample.
As a result, we would overestimate the “true” level of backbench opposition.
To address this problem, we estimate a sample selection model (also called Type 2 Tobit
model or Heckman model) in which we jointly estimate TDs’ likelihood to speak and their ex-
pressed level of government support and opposition. Let z∗i denote the latent dependent variable in
26
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the selection equation and zi a dummy variable that indicates who spoke:
z∗i = Z
′
iγ+ui (11)
zi =

1 if z∗i > 0
0 if z∗i ≤ 0
(12)
where Z is a matrix of all variables included in the selection model. The outcome equation is
yi =

X ′iβ+ εi if z∗i > 0
− if z∗i ≤ 0
(13)
where legislator i’s Wordscores score, yi, is only observed if he or she participated in the debate.
We assume ui ∼ N (0,1), εi ∼ N (0,σ2), and corr(ui,εi) = ρ, that is, the error terms follow a
bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation ρ.18 If ρ = 0, the error terms are
uncorrelated and OLS estimators from the subsample of speakers will be unbiased and consistent.
If ρ 6= 0, OLS estimators will be biased and inconsistent because of selection on unobservables.
As before, we turn to Bayesian inference for model estimation and include varying intercepts
for legislators in both equations. The full model we estimate is as follows:
Outcome model:
yi ∼N (µouti ,τ) (14)
µouti = α j[i]+X
′
iβ (15)
α j ∼N (µα,σ2αTD) (16)
18The assumption of a bivariate normal distribution is a standard assumption in these types of models, though
there is no theoretical justification for it. Recent advances in Bayesian semiparametric methods offer less restrictive
identification strategies (van Hasselt, 2011), but are computationally more difficult to estimate.
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.
Selection model:
zi ∼ Bernoulli(pii) (17)
pii =Φ
(
µi
σi
)
(18)
µi = µseli +
(ρ
σ
)
· (yi−µouti ) (19)
µseli = δ j[i]+Z
′
iγ (20)
σi =
√
1−ρ2 (21)
δ j ∼N (µδ,σ2δTD) (22)
with Eq. 19 following from the bivariate normality assumption.
Figure 9 (and Table B.5 in Appendix B) summarizes the results for the full model that in-
cludes all variables and interaction effects from Models 3 in the separately estimated models. The
estimated ρ is -0.17, indicating a small, negative correlation between error terms, but with relatively
high uncertainty on the estimated parameter. All other estimated coefficients are very similar in
size and direction from the separately estimated models.
In Figure 10, we calculate predicted Wordscores estimates from the joint model. These fitted
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Figure 10: Predicted verbal expression of budget support conditional on constituency unemploy-
ment rate (top panel) and electoral safety (bottom panel) before and during the economics crisis,
from the multilevel selection model. Shaded area indicates 95% credible interval.
values reflect the direct effects from the outcome equation as well as the indirect effects from the
selection equation for those variables that are included in both models. The plotted results are
indistinguishable from the fitted values plotted in Figure 8, indicating that—based on our specifi-
cation of the selection model—the non-random selection of speakers has no noticeable impact on
the estimated levels of government support.
This does not mean that we can rule out entirely the possibility of selection bias in our
findings. Assuming we have correctly specified the selection equation (including the assumption
of bivariate normally distributed error terms), however, no such bias is present. While this is not
guaranteed, we have at least provided evidence that for a reasonable set of variables we are unable
to confirm a systematic bias due to selection. Moreover, our framework serves as an example for
those seeking to measure or explain positions from speeches, since selection effects are almost
certainly present (e.g Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, Forthcoming; Proksch and Slapin, 2012, 2015).
Despite not finding such a bias in our application, our approach demonstrates how knowledge of
speaker selection may and should be used to test for and control possible selection bias effects.
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Conclusions
Our investigation of legislative positioning over austerity debates has explored the differences in
preferences for austerity expressed by legislators whose votes on the budget fail to reveal any
differences in their preferences due to strict party discipline. By measuring positioning on critical
budget votes, we have used textual data from speeches to reveal the heterogeneity in legislator
preferences that would otherwise appear to present a common position as unitary parties. From
our results we draw several conclusions.
First, there is clear positional information on a uni-dimensional latent scale of support for
versus opposition to austerity measures, as expressed in the budget speeches. Our results have
a high degree of face validity when compared to known legislative positions, with government
ministers being most supportive of the budgets, opposition speakers most opposed, and govern-
ment backbenchers in between. Text scaling as used, and specifically the supervised Wordscores
approach of Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003), provides a valid method for measuring intra-party
differences as expressed in speeches made during debates involving single-dimension positioning
such as those taken in speeches over annual budgets.
Second, by fixing the scales of legislative positions each year to the positions expressed by
government and opposition finance spokespersons—using the Martin and Vanberg (2007) method
for rescaling unknown text positions relative to binary anchor points in the training set—we were
able to compare the relative cohesion of budgetary support across different budget years. Our re-
sults show two strong patterns. First, opposition speakers were more united against budgets, while
speakers from governing parties showed far more heterogeneity of expressed positions. In the ef-
fort to explain themselves or to avoid blame despite being forced by party responsibilities to vote
for a budget, government legislators tended to express less cohesive views, with non-ministerial
speakers displaying the least amount of agreement with the government’s official position. Second,
with the onset of painful austerity budgets around 2009, government cohesion declined further, in-
dicating that incentives for blame avoidance rise when there is more blame to avoid.
Third, looking at individual differences between expressed positions during some of the
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harshest austerity budgets, we have uncovered evidence that legislators use their speeches to ex-
press positions reflecting a balance between party and office demands on the one hand, and con-
stituency interests on the other. Legislators who occupied ministerial posts spoke more in favor
of the budgets than backbench governing party legislators, a result that held quite consistently
across years and changing conditions. This relationship also held for opposition parties, with party
leaders tending to speak more in a median position of their parties rather than striking up more ex-
treme positions, despite these extreme positions offering the greatest opposition to the government
position.
On the side of constituency interests, we also found evidence that legislators who were
elected from more vulnerable constituencies tended to express more anti-austerity positions than
legislators from less vulnerable constituencies. Legislators with stronger constituency-based rea-
sons to avoid the pain of austerity tended to oppose these measures more. We have uncovered sys-
tematic evidence that the degree of expressed support for austerity measures varies widely across
party members in ways that can be explained using political and demographic variables specific to
each speaker’s constituency.
While our look at intra-party differences over austerity measures has focused on budget de-
bates in Ireland, the logic applies much more broadly to the difficult legislative choices being faced
by legislatures across Europe, in particular Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Parties may demand
and enforce a unified vote on budgets through strict party discipline, but these unified votes may
mask significant tensions that arise from intra-party differences. While some systems may allow
legislators to vote sincerely, many more are characterized by strong party discipline, especially on
crucial measures such as annual budgets. In such systems, examining what legislators say, rather
than simply how they vote, has the potential to reveal the extent and source of these differences.
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A Data Overview
Table A.1: Government composition and office holders, 1987–2013.
Economic Debate Budget Government Taoiseach Finance Opposition
period date year parties (prime minister) minister spokesperson
Pre- 03-1987 1987 FF C. Haughey (FF) R. MacSharry (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
boom 01-1988 1988 FF C. Haughey (FF) R. MacSharry (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
01-1989 1989 FF C. Haughey (FF) A. Reynolds (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
01-1990 1990 FF, PD C. Haughey (FF) A. Reynolds (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
01-1991 1991 FF, PD C. Haughey (FF) A. Reynolds (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
01-1992 1992 FF, PD C. Haughey (FF) B. Ahern (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
02-1993 1993 FF, Lab A. Reynolds (FF) B. Ahern (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
01-1994 1994 FF, Lab A. Reynolds (FF) B. Ahern (FF) I. Yates (FG)
Boom 02-1995 1995 FG, Lab, DL J. Bruton (FG) R. Quinn (Lab) C. McCreevy (FF)
years 01-1996 1996 FG, Lab, DL J. Bruton (FG) R. Quinn (Lab) C. McCreevy (FF)
01-1997 1997 FG, Lab, DL J. Bruton (FG) R. Quinn (Lab) C. McCreevy (FF)
12-1997 1998 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) C. McCreevy (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
12-1998 1999 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) C. McCreevy (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
12-1999 2000 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) C. McCreevy (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
12-2000 2001 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) C. McCreevy (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
12-2001 2002 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) C. McCreevy (FF) J. Mitchell (FG)
12-2002 2003 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) C. McCreevy (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
12-2003 2004 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) C. McCreevy (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
12-2004 2005 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) B. Cowen (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
12-2005 2006 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) B. Cowen (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
12-2006 2007 FF, PD B. Ahern (FF) B. Cowen (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
12-2007 2008 FF, PD, Gr B. Ahern (FF) B. Cowen (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
Crisis 10-2008 2009 FF, PD, Gr B. Cowen (FF) B. Lenihan (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
12-2009 2010 FF, Gr B. Cowen (FF) B. Lenihan (FF) R. Bruton (FG)
12-2010 2011 FF, Gr B. Cowen (FF) B. Lenihan (FF) M. Noonan (FG)
12-2011 2012 FG, Lab E. Kenny (FG) M. Noonan (FG) M. McGrath (FF)
12-2012 2013 FG, Lab E. Kenny (FG) M. Noonan (FG) M. McGrath (FF)
Notes: FF: Fianna Fa´il, FG: Fine Gael, Lab: Labour Party, PD: Progressive Democrats, Gr: Green Party,
DL: Democratic Left.
39
Table A.2: Speaker composition in budget debates, 1987–2013.
Economic Debate Budget N Debate N Cabinet Back- Opposition
period date year obs length speakers members benchers members
(# days) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Pre- 03-1987 1987 166 9 53 13 (25) 12 (23) 28 (53)
boom 01-1988 1988 166 12 52 13 (25) 11 (21) 28 (54)
01-1989 1989 166 5 54 15 (28) 11 (20) 28 (52)
01-1990 1990 166 9 72 16 (22) 18 (25) 38 (53)
01-1991 1991 166 8 86 12 (14) 29 (34) 45 (52)
01-1992 1992 166 5 62 13 (21) 12 (19) 37 (60)
02-1993 1993 166 10 71 15 (21) 26 (37) 30 (42)
01-1994 1994 164 8 87 20 (23) 26 (30) 41 (47)
Boom 02-1995 1995 166 8 68 17 (25) 14 (21) 37 (54)
years 01-1996 1996 164 8 86 18 (21) 30 (35) 38 (44)
01-1997 1997 166 12 66 19 (29) 14 (21) 33 (50)
12-1997 1998 164 12 48 14 (29) 9 (19) 25 (52)
12-1998 1999 166 5 73 19 (26) 16 (22) 38 (52)
12-1999 2000 166 6 53 14 (26) 12 (23) 27 (51)
12-2000 2001 165 4 28 8 (29) 3 (11) 17 (61)
12-2001 2002 166 3 37 10 (27) 11 (30) 16 (43)
12-2002 2003 166 3 41 9 (22) 9 (22) 23 (56)
12-2003 2004 166 4 56 14 (25) 10 (18) 32 (57)
12-2004 2005 164 2 42 10 (24) 7 (17) 25 (60)
12-2005 2006 166 2 34 12 (35) 1 (3) 21 (62)
12-2006 2007 166 2 37 12 (32) 5 (14) 20 (54)
12-2007 2008 166 3 53 14 (26) 12 (23) 27 (51)
Crisis 10-2008 2009 165 8 95 25 (26) 15 (16) 55 (58)
12-2009 2010 165 5 14 4 (29) 1 (7) 9 (64)
12-2010 2011 166 2 37 14 (38) 2 (5) 21 (57)
12-2011 2012 165 2 55 18 (33) 6 (11) 31 (56)
12-2012 2013 166 2 43 11 (26) 6 (14) 26 (60)
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B Model Results
Table B.3: Multilevel probit model of speaker selection in budget debates, 1987–2013.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept −0.90 −0.78 −0.91
[−1.78; −0.04] [−1.69; 0.11] [−1.80; −0.04]
Constituency unemployment 0.08 0.19 0.14
[0.02; 0.15] [0.10; 0.28] [0.03; 0.27]
Electoral safety 0.00 0.01 0.02
[−0.05; 0.06] [−0.05; 0.07] [−0.07; 0.11]
Legislative seniority −0.22 −0.22 −0.23
[−0.28; −0.16] [−0.28; −0.15] [−0.30; −0.17]
Party leader 1.56 1.62 1.62
[1.22; 1.91] [1.28; 1.95] [1.29; 1.97]
Government −0.40 −0.40 −0.35
[−0.53; −0.27] [−0.53; −0.27] [−0.48; −0.21]
Cabinet member 0.69 0.69 0.73
[0.55; 0.83] [0.54; 0.84] [0.58; 0.87]
Party size (log) −0.06 −0.05 −0.02
[−0.14; 0.02] [−0.14; 0.03] [−0.09; 0.05]
Debate days (log) 0.34 0.26 0.25
[0.25; 0.42] [0.15; 0.35] [0.14; 0.35]
Crisis −0.06 0.04 0.37
[−0.22; 0.11] [−0.13; 0.20] [0.10; 0.62]
Const. unemployment x Crisis −0.29 −0.30
[−0.44; −0.15] [−0.49; −0.11]
Electoral safety x Crisis −0.06 0.13
[−0.18; 0.07] [−0.11; 0.35]
Government x Crisis −0.56
[−0.90; −0.24]
Const. unemployment x Government 0.09
[−0.04; 0.21]
Electoral safety x Government −0.03
[−0.14; 0.08]
Const. unemployment x Government x Crisis −0.00
[−0.24; 0.25]
Electoral safety x Government x Crisis −0.17
[−0.44; 0.11]
µα −0.90 −0.78 −0.91
[−1.24; −0.57] [−1.09; −0.38] [−1.22; −0.57]
σα 0.62 0.64 0.64
[0.54; 0.70] [0.56; 0.72] [0.56; 0.73]
N obs. 4333 4333 4333
N legislators 444 444 444
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Table B.4: Multilevel linear regression of position taking in budget debates, 1987–2013.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept −0.28 −0.27 −0.27
[−0.43; −0.13] [−0.42; −0.12] [−0.43; −0.12]
Constituency unemployment −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
[−0.03; −0.01] [−0.02; 0.01] [−0.03; 0.01]
Electoral safety −0.01 −0.00 −0.00
[−0.02; 0.01] [−0.02; 0.01] [−0.02; 0.02]
Legislative seniority −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
[−0.03; −0.00] [−0.03; −0.00] [−0.03; −0.00]
Government 0.18 0.18 0.18
[0.15; 0.21] [0.14; 0.21] [0.15; 0.21]
Cabinet member 0.30 0.31 0.31
[0.26; 0.34] [0.27; 0.34] [0.27; 0.35]
Crisis 0.02 0.03 0.04
[−0.02; 0.05] [−0.00; 0.07] [−0.01; 0.10]
Const. unemployment x Crisis −0.04 −0.03
[−0.07; −0.02] [−0.07; 0.01]
Electoral safety x Crisis −0.01 −0.00
[−0.05; 0.02] [−0.05; 0.05]
Government x Crisis −0.02
[−0.09; 0.06]
Const. unemployment x Government 0.01
[−0.02; 0.04]
Electoral safety x Government −0.01
[−0.03; 0.02]
Const. unemployment x Government x Crisis −0.03
[−0.08; 0.02]
Electoral safety x Government x Crisis −0.02
[−0.08; 0.04]
µα −0.28 −0.27 −0.27
[−0.30; −0.26] [−0.30; −0.25] [−0.30; −0.25]
σα 0.11 0.11 0.11
[0.10; 0.13] [0.10; 0.13] [0.10; 0.13]
σ 0.18 0.18 0.18
[0.18; 0.19] [0.18; 0.19] [0.18; 0.19]
N obs. 1430 1430 1430
N legislators 317 317 317
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Table B.5: Multilevel selection model of speaker selection and position taking in budget debates,
1987–2013.
Speaker selection Position taking
Intercept −0.95 −0.25
[−1.88; −0.02] [−0.43; −0.08]
Constituency unemployment 0.14 −0.02
[0.03; 0.26] [−0.04; 0.00]
Electoral safety 0.01 −0.00
[−0.08; 0.09] [−0.02; 0.02]
Legislative seniority −0.23 −0.01
[−0.29; −0.16] [−0.03; 0.00]
Party leader 1.64
[1.31; 2.00]
Government −0.36 0.18
[−0.50; −0.21] [0.15; 0.21]
Cabinet member 0.73 0.30
[0.57; 0.88] [0.27; 0.34]
Party size (log) −0.01
[−0.12; 0.08]
Debate days (log) 0.26
[0.14; 0.36]
Crisis 0.37 0.04
[0.11; 0.61] [−0.00; 0.09]
Const. unemployment x Crisis −0.30 −0.03
[−0.51; −0.09] [−0.07; 0.01]
Electoral safety x Crisis 0.15 −0.00
[−0.07; 0.37] [−0.05; 0.04]
Government x Crisis −0.56 −0.00
[−0.88; −0.24] [−0.08; 0.07]
Const. unemployment x Government 0.08 0.01
[−0.05; 0.22] [−0.02; 0.04]
Electoral safety x Government −0.02 −0.00
[−0.13; 0.09] [−0.03; 0.02]
Const. unemployment x Government x Crisis 0.00 −0.03
[−0.26; 0.25] [−0.08; 0.03]
Electoral safety x Government x Crisis −0.19 −0.02
[−0.46; 0.07] [−0.08; 0.04]
µselα −0.94
[−1.35; −0.51]
σselα 0.64
[0.56; 0.73]
µoutα −0.25
[−0.29; −0.21]
σoutα 0.11
[0.10; 0.13]
σ 0.18
[0.18; 0.19]
ρ −0.15
[−0.33; 0.05]
N obs. 4333 4333
N legislators 444 444
N speakers 317 317
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